University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Aug 2025 - presentPh.D. in Computer Science
GPA 4.00 / 4.00
Academic background
Yuanchen Tang · Updated October 2026
Download CV PDFPh.D. in Computer Science
GPA 4.00 / 4.00
B.S. in Computer Science · Turing Class
GPA 3.80 / 4.00
My research lies at the intersection of computer science and economics, particularly machine learning, algorithmic game theory, and reinforcement learning. I am also interested in AI economics.
When can competing firms exchange data stably? We characterize how customer rationality shapes the existence of core-stable exchanges.
OpenReviewA practical sealed-bid auction protocol that outsources timed-commitment puzzles and incentivizes truthful reporting by bidders and solvers.
arXivUniversity of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · Champaign, USA
Advised by Prof. Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury and Prof. Ruta Mehta
I study the stability of data exchange among competing firms and how customer behavior affects incentives to cooperate.
A core-stable exchange always exists in fully rational markets for any monotone continuous prediction and utility functions, when customers choose the top-performing firm. With partially rational customers and logit-style demand, core-stable exchanges may fail to exist.
Game theory · Machine learning
Carnegie Mellon University · Pittsburgh, USA
Advised by Prof. Steven Wu
I work on provably efficient multi-agent planning in large general-sum Markov games, motivated by congestion control and public goods provision.
We developed provably efficient algorithms for a class of Nash-computable games in which unilateral deviations have bounded influence on rewards and dynamics.
Game theory · Multi-agent planning
Peking University · Beijing, China
Advised by Prof. Xiaotie Deng
I studied how to make blockchain auctions practical by outsourcing the cost of solving timed-commitment puzzles.
We introduced a puzzle-outsourcing market, designed a practical protocol that incentivizes truthful reporting of bidders' and solvers' private values, and derived an optimal pricing strategy for auctioneers.
Auction theory · Mechanism design · Cryptography · Incentive analysis